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Present-Day Effects of United States
Bombing of Laos During the Vietnam
War: Can Injured Laotians Recover Under
the Federal Tort Claims Act?
From break of day
Till sunset glow
I toil.
I dig my well
I plow my field,
And earn my food and drink.
What care I
Who rules the land
If I
Am left in peace?
Anonymous (Chinese, 2300 B.C.)'
The roar of the bombs and the noise of the planes frightened me
terribly. Our life... was without tomorrows. Each day, across the
forests and ditches, we sought only to escape from the bombs. When
looking at the face of my innocent child, I could not stop crying for
hisfuture .... Why do the men in this world not love each other,...
[aind why do they kill each other this way?... In any case, in all
that happens, it is the innocent people who suffer all the terrible con-
sequences so fatal and tragic.
Laotian Refugee (1971)2
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Vietnam War, the United States conducted a massive
aerial bombing campaign over Laos. The bombing had two official
purposes. First, the United States sought to interdict the major south-
1. War-Related Civilian Problems in Indochina. Part II: Laos and Cambodia: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1971) (Appendix II, prepared by
Fred Branfman) [hereinafter Hearings]. Lewis Sitzer, a volunteer in Laos with International
Volunteer Services, Inc., included this poem in a newsletter to friends and family in the United
States. As he was clearing his belongings from the remains of his house, which was destroyed
along with the rest of his village during an American bombing raid, he noticed the poem on the
Laotian War Resister's League Peace Calendar hanging on the wall. Id.
2. Hearings, supra note I, at 108. Essay by a Laotian refugee.
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bound North Vietnamese supply route known as the Ho Chi Minh
Trail.3 Second, the bombing provided specifically-requested aerial
support for the general operations of the Royal Lao Army.4 The im-
mediate impact was devastating. The bombing wiped out entire vil-
lages,5 killing more civilian villagers than communist soldiers.
6
3. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., BACKGROUND
INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM 355, 359 (Comm. Print 1970)
(Statement by President Nixon on the Situation in Laos, Mar. 6, 1970) [hereinafter Nixon
Statement].
4. Id.
5. Hearings, supra note 1, at 90-113. Consider the following excerpts from refugee
interviews:
Q. How many of the 100 houses in the town weren't destroyed or damaged by
the bombing?
A. [In] 1969 they were all lost, but he says in some cases there were still posts
standing.
Q. Now, among those 21 villages are there still any houses left?
A. Now, among those 21 villages, there is not a single house left.
Q. Why is there not a single house left?
A. The airplanes bombed them.
Q. The airplanes bombed them all?
A. Yes.
Id. at 105, 111.
6. Id. at 90-113. From refugee interviews:
Q. What of the 60 people killed and injured, were most of them old people, or
were they Pathet Lao soldiers or were they children? Or were they simply men working
in fields during the day and not working for the Pathet Lao?
A. He says, well, he can't say, you know about their ages, they were like all
ages. But, as far as soldiers, they never saw any soldiers, get killed by the bombing.
They never sad [sic] a Pathet Lao soldier die.
Q. Why was that?
A. He says that they were in their own area and the villagers were in a differ-
ent area. And they never saw any soldiers, the soldiers were off in the forest.
Q. Were, did,... then did these people who were killed, do I understand you're
telling me, that they had nothing to do with the war at all?
A. He says he doesn't know anything about the war.., all he know [sic] is
about these 20 people was that they were simple villagers, just farmers, they didn't
have guns. He says as far as the soldiers go that's the soldiers' business, I don't know
anything about soldiers.
Q. Did the Pathet Lao ever come, I gather from what he said before that the
Pathet Lao never came to his village, that they were some distance from it. Did the
people ever wonder why they were being bombed?
A. He says during that period, they couldn't think. They were very afraid.
They hated just like that.
Q. Did you think it was the Lao bombing you or did you think it was the
Americans?
A. He says at that time we didn't know who it was but the Pathet Lao would
tell us that it was the Americans.
Q. When did they see the Pathet Lao?
A. They would come to talk to us in the village, propaganda talks in the
village.
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This modern, war-torn history has left Laos a poor and underde-
veloped country.7 However, in the late 1980s, Laos began to stabilize
economically and politically.8 Despite its communist government,
Laos is reaching out to its Western-oriented neighbors in hopes of
Q. And did you see any Pathet Lao soldiers killed?
A. He says no, he doesn't know about that.., he never went out... looking
around the place.
Q. But did you ever hear of Pathet Lao being killed or injured by the bombs?
A. He said that he heard of Pathet Lao soldiers being wounded but the [sic]
never heard of any dying.
Q. Were there any Pathet Lao in your town at all?
A. He says he doesn't know... he didn't see anything.
Q. Didn't they come in every now and then and talk to the people?
A. When the shooting (bombing) started they weren't there.
Q. The townspeople were but the Pathet Lao were long gone, huh?
A. Yes.
Id. at 102-06.
From a sample case history of a victim of the bombs:
Thao Sipha: Thao Sipha's father: My son is six years old. We are from Ban
Ngoui.
Sao Toun became very afraid and jumped out of trench and began running.
The planes bombed, and she was killed.
In July, 1969, we were all sitting in our small shelter out in the forest, when
planes bombed around 11 a.m.
Two people with us, a man aged 60 and a little girl aged 7, were killed lying in
their beds.
My son's hand was hit and his fingers flew up, embedding themselves in the
roof.
Id. at 109.
7. L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, Part I, at 2, col. 1. Laos is one of the poorest nations in
the world. Sesser, A Reporter at Large: Forgotten Country, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 20, 1990,
at 44. In 1988, the gross national product was $546,000,000, less than the revenue of over 800
United States companies. Id. Per capita income is $156 a year. Id. One hundred and nine
babies out of every thousand dies. This infant-mortality rate is three times higher than Thai-
land's rate and ten times greater than the United States' rate. Id. This poverty is a direct
result of the fighting in Laos during the 1960s and the 1970s. With farmers comprising over 75
percent of the population, the war on and over their fields disrupted the nation's major source
of wealth. Id.
8. L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, Part I, at 2, col. 1. When the Pathet Lao claimed victory
in 1975, it immediately sent people to reeducation camps. As a result, most of the country's
educated elite fled. The new government also attempted to collectivize the economy. How-
ever, this was met by reduced production from the peasants. This reaction and the effects of
the previous 15 years of violence caused the economy to collapse. Consequently, Laos became
dependent on its neighbors. Id.
In 1979, the Communist Party, realizing its problems, abandoned the collective economy
idea and allowed increased private ownership. Sesser, supra note 7, at 63. Additionally, the
government has become increasingly conscious of the country's natural resources. Id. The
state recently constructed a highway connecting Laos with the Vietnamese coast, reducing the
country's dependence on Thailand. L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, Part I, at 2, col. 1. This new
attitude is called chin ta nakan mai, or "new thinking." Sesser, supra note 7, at 48-49.
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economic self-improvement. 9 Yet such improvement is difficult, if not
impossible, for a country that cannot afford to make its arable land
safe to farm. ' 0 Two decades after the war, innocent villagers continue
to be maimed and killed by unexploded bombs in their villages and
rice fields.'I
These modern-day victims have no local remedy for their prob-
lem. The Lao government cannot afford to pay money damages to its
citizens for injuries resulting from hostile enemy actions two decades
ago.12 Meanwhile, each victim becomes an economic burden to his or
her family and community. Each person killed by an old bomb repre-
sents one less able body to assist in farming. Each person that merely
loses a limb not only represents one less able body, but continues to be
a mouth to feed.
Because the United States government owns these bombs and is
directly responsible for their presence in Laos, it is a reasonable party
against whom to attach liability for the Laotian injuries. The United
States, however, enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued in
American courts without its consent.' 3 By enacting the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"),' 4 Congress expressly waived the federal gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity in limited circumstances.' 5 The
FTCA's general purpose is to provide a remedy to those injured by
negligent federal employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.' 6 A second statute which may be applicable to this problem is
the Foreign Claims Act ("FCA").17 The FCA provides an adminis-
trative remedy for inhabitants of foreign countries who are injured by
the noncombatant activities of the United States military.' 8
9. Sesser, supra note 7, at 62; L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, Part I, at 2, col. 1. With
Vietnam and the Soviet Union recently bickering over which would exert its influence over
Laos, the government in Vientiane is showing some signs of independence and a potentially
receptive attitude towards United States economic aid. Kaylor, A Land Where Russia, Viet-
nam Vie for Power, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1982, at 43; Hiebert, Laos: The Road
to Reform, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 16, 1989, at 18.
10. L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1 (bulldog ed.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1987, § A, at 9, col. 1 (city final ed.).
11. Sesser, supra note 7, at 41-42; see L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. I
(bulldog ed.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, § A, at 9, col. 1 (city final ed.).
12. See Sesser, supra note 7, at 44.
13. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-2680 (1982).
15. See id. § 1346.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1945).
17. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988).
18. Id.
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This Comment will identify and discuss the remedies modern
Laotian victims might have against the United States government
under United States law. 19 After briefly highlighting the history of
the United States' involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War,20
this Comment will discuss the nature and extent of damages these
civilians have suffered. It will then consider the applicability of the
FTCA and the FCA to this situation. Although concluding that any
claims the Lao may have under the FTCA would, in all likelihood
fail, this Comment suggests a chance of limited success under the
FCA. Finally, this Comment will propose an alternative political so-
lution to the problem: If under existing law there is even a remote
chance of a substantial recovery against the United States, perhaps
Congress can be persuaded to take necessary steps to redress the grave
losses the Lao people continue to suffer.
II. THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN LAOS
A. Historical Facts
United States involvement in Laos evolved gradually, much as it
did in Vietnam.21 At the end of the French Indochina War in 1954,
the commanders-in-chief of the French Union Forces and the Peo-
ple's Army of Vietnam signed the Agreement on the Cessation of
19. For an analysis of a similar problem in Libya after World War II, see Partsch, Rem-
nants of War as a Legal Problem in the Light of the Libyan Case, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 386
(1984). After World War II, Libya faced the problem of unexploded land mines placed there
by Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 387. Partsch analyzed the legal implica-
tions under principles of international law. He concluded that there was no practical remedy
for the Libyans under international law and the problem could only be resolved by mutual
cooperation between the countries involved. Id. at 400. The article's final paragraph stated:
One should not rely too much on legal doctrines, one of the participants [of the 1981
symposium on the Libyan mines] had urged: "Let's tackle that problem in a practical
way, in a manner that is uncontroversial and can obtain the consensus of the interna-
tional community." Certainly, a practical approach would be commendable. Yet
the question remains whether this practical way would be more effective if it were
used in bilateral negotiations or in discussions involving a larger community of states,
which inevitably would bring one back to legal doctrines.
Id. at 401.
20. For a thorough treatment of the history of the United States' involvement in Laos,
see Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They
Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1990) [hereinafter Ely, The American War in
Indochina, Part I1]. Professor Ely concludes that the United States' war in Laos and Cambo-
dia was unconstitutional primarily because of its secrecy. Id. at 1094, 1099, 1132.
21. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON
REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA 17 (Comm. Print 1970)
[hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS].
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Hostilities in Laos.22 Differing interpretations of the Agreement re-
sulted in continued hostilities between the Pathet Lao and the Royal
Government.2 3 In 1956, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the leader of the
neutralist faction, gained power and attempted to reconcile with the
Pathet Lao.2 4 These efforts resulted in a coalition government includ-
ing all three historic Laotian factions: the Royalists, the Neutralists
and the Leftists (Pathet Lao).2 5 By the end of 1958, Laos was at peace
for the first time since World War 11.26
Laos' new found tranquility did not last long. The growing polit-
ical power of the leftist Pathet Lao2 7 alarmed the United States, which
had hoped at the very least to keep Laos neutral.2 8 A group of pro-
Western conservatives ousted Souvanna and installed Phoui
Sananikone as Prime Minister.2 9 Phoui immediately exhibited a pro-
Western policy, resulting in military and economic assistance from
the United States between 1955 and 1962 totalling $450 million.30
The Soviet Union responded by rendering overt aid to the Neutral-
22. Id. at 17; D. WHITAKER, H. BARTH, S. BERMAN, J. HEIMANN, J. MACDONALD, K.
MARTINDALE & R. SHINN, AREA HANDBOOK FOR LAOS 35, 189 (1972) [hereinafter WHITA-
KER]; Dai, Canada's Role in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos,
THE CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 235 (1972). The Agreement, signed at the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference, ended the fighting between the French and the Viet Minh. WHITAKER, supra, at 35.
The Viet Minh were the communist Vietnamese faction resisting French colonial rule in Viet-
nam. Id. The Agreement called for the withdrawal of all French and Vietnamese troops from
Laos and the transfer of Pathet Lao troops to the Lao provinces of Phongsaly and Sam Neua,
"pending a political settlement." Dai, supra, at 236. The "political settlement" would inte-
grate the Pathet Lao into the general Laotian community. WHITAKER, supra, at 35. Laos was
on the Geneva Convention agenda because the French Indochina War was partly conducted
on Laotian soil. 4 R. BuHrrE, THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD POWER: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1973 569 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. ed. 1973)
[hereinafter Schlesinger].
23. Dai, supra note 22, at 239-43; Schlesinger, supra note 22, at 569; see WHITAKER,
supra note 22, at 35.
24. Dai, supra note 22, at 245.
25. Id. The Pathet Lao was the military force of the Neo Lao Hak Xat (or Lao Patriotic
Front). In 1965, it was renamed the Lao People's Liberation Army. WHITAKER, supra note
22, at 35, 279, 322.
26. Dai, supra note 22, at 246.
27. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 35-36; Dai, supra note 22, at 247.
28. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS
1067 (1962) (President Kennedy replying to a question at a news conference, January 15,
1962); STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 17; see WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 191; Dai, supra note 22, at 247.
29. Dai, supra note 22, at 248.
30. Id. Phoui's government tried to suppress the Pathet Lao and other "dangerous ideol-
ogies" throughout the country. Schlesinger, supra note 22, at 569-70. The resulting United
States aid came in the form of supplies and military equipment as well as advisors and techni-
cians. Id. at 569.
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ists. a3 Meanwhile, North Vietnam offered its support to the Pathet
Lao.32
Inevitably, verbal warfare escalated into armed conflict. 33 No
single faction was able to maintain a legitimate government in Vien-
tiane, Laos' modern capital.3 4 Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk urged an
international conference to restore peace in Laos and to recognize
that nation's neutrality.35 The conference convened in Geneva in
May 1961 and resulted in a coalition government with Souvanna
Phouma as premier. 36 In July 1962, Souvanna declared that Laos
would not participate in any future military activity or alliance,37 nor
would Laos accept further military assistance or permit foreign mili-
tary bases on its soil. 31
In an effort to protect his country's precarious neutrality,
Souvanna unsuccessfully sought to establish an independent Lao mili-
tary force consisting of the three coalition members.3 9 However, the
pro-Western faction soon ousted Souvanna,4 and Laos reverted to its
pre-Geneva Conference configuration. 41 The Royalists controlled
Vientiane and the Mekong Valley, which contained roughly half the
territory and two-thirds of the population of Laos.42 The Pathet Lao
and the North Vietnamese Army commanded the northeastern region
and the southern panhandle, 43 while the Neutralists governed the
31. Dai, supra note 22, at 248; see WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 196, 198. The Soviet
Union provided supplies and weapons. Schlesinger, supra note 22, at 569.
32. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 193-95; Dai, supra note 22, at 249. North Vietnam
helped recruit and train guerrilla forces. Schlesinger, supra note 22, at 569.
33. Dai, supra note 22, at 248-49.
34. Id. at 249.
35. Id. at 249-50. The United States and Great Britain agreed to participate in the con-
ference on the condition that a verified cease-fire existed in Laos before the Convention con-
vened. Id. at 250. United States participation became a reality partly because of a new
administration in Washington which had reluctantly recognized a neutral government in Laos.
Id. at 249; see also, WHrrAKER, supra note 22, at 36, 191.
36. Nixon Statement, supra note 3, at 356; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 4, 37; Dai, supra
note 22, at 250-51.
37. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 192; Dai, supra note 22, at 251.
38. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 192; Dai, supra note 22, at 251.
39. Dai, supra note 22, at 252.
40. Schlesinger, supra note 22, at 570.
41. Dai, supra note 22, at 252.
42. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 19; Dai, supra note 22, at 252.
43. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 19; Dai, supra note 22, at 252.
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northern provinces."
In 1963, hostilities erupted again, this time with the Royalists
and the Neutralists allied against the Pathet Lao.45 Laos became em-
broiled in a series of seasonal offensives. As the conflict intensified, so
too did the interest of neighbors and superpowers." Therefore, it is
not surprising that Laos' internal struggle was closely linked to the
ongoing war in Vietnam.47 The Pathet Lao received considerable mil-
itary aid from North Vietnam in its fight to retain control of the Plain
of Jars region48 and to establish a government in Vientiane.49 In re-
turn for this assistance, the Pathet Lao fought to keep the Ho Chi
Minh Trail open.5° The trail, a system of roads and footpaths, was a
major artery over which the North Vietnamese transported troops
and supplies to South Vietnam.5' As the war between North and
South Vietnam intensified, Laos was drawn ever-deeper into the con-
44. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 19; Dai, supra note 22, at 252.
45. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 4, 37; Dai, supra note 22, at 252.
46. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 19; see Nixon Statement, supra note 3, at 356; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 36-37; Lao"
Plain (and Fancy) Talk, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1970, at 34.
47. See 1 G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE DRAMA OF NATIONS 398
(1968). "It is patently clear that there can be no hope of peace and stability in Laos unless
there is a settlement of the more bloody struggle in Vietnam such as to bring about a slacken-
ing of cold war tensions throughout the whole area of what was formerly French Indo-China."
Id.
48. The Plain of Jars is a region in northern Laos where much of the local fighting during
the Vietnam War took place. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 12, 92. Ringed by mountains, its
elevation averages 3,600 feet above sea level. The name comes from ancient stone jars, three to
eight feet high, that lie in a meadow at the center of the region. Scholars believe the jars were
funeral urns dating back roughly 2,000 years. W. BURCHETT, THE FURTIVE WAR: THE
UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM AND LAOS 200 (1963); A. DOMMEN, CONFLICT IN LAOS: THE
POLITICS OF NEUTRALIZATION 2 (1964).
49. Nixon Statement, supra note 3, at 356; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 281; FACTS ON
FILE, INC., 5 SOUTH VIETNAM: U.S.-COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1970, 21 (1973) [hereinafter FACTS ON FILE].
50. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, SUpra note
21, at 19; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 8, 281.
51. Nixon Statement, supra note 3, at 356, 358; FACTS ON FILE, supra note 49, at 22; see
WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 5. The Chinese had been shipping military supplies through
Cambodia to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. In 1969, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia prohib-
ited Chinese ships from entering the port of Sihanoukville. As a result, the supplies were
shipped to Viet Cong camps on the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam, prompting
United States troops to neutralize the Viet Cong camps. This left the Ho Chi Minh Trail as
the only remaining open route from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Laos: American Air
Support for Invading Troops from South Viet-Nam, 17 ASIAN RECORDER 10070 (Mar. 26-Apr.
1, 1971).
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flict, despite its attempts to remain neutral.5 2
By 1965, the United States' major objective in Laos was to neu-
tralize the Ho Chi Minh Trail in order to prevent North Vietnamese
infiltration of South Vietnam.5 3 In addition, the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") conducted its own covert activity in Laos.54 The
CIA maintained a clandestine army of "irregular forces" comprised
of Hmong tribesmen5 and Thai56 forces, commanded by General
52. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 17.
53. Id.; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 203, 278.
54. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 92D CONG., IST SESS., REPORT
ON LAOS: APRIL 1971 14-15 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL
1971]; STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 27-28; L. JOHNSON, AMERICA'S SECRET POWER: THE CIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
26 (1989); R. JEFFREYS-JONES, THE CIA AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 132-33 (1989); Scott,
Laos: The Story Nixon Won't Tell, N.Y. REV., Apr. 9, 1970, at 37; see Ely, The American War
in Indochina, Part II, supra note 20, at 1095-1100.
55. The Hmong (originally known as the Meo) are an ethnic minority of Tibeto-Burman
origin who live in the mountain regions of Laos. According to Chinese records, they originally
lived along the Yellow River. Oppressed by the Chinese, the Hmong migrated south from
China into Burma, Thailand, and Laos. It is not certain when they first arrived in Laos, but by
the mid-1800s the Hmong were settled in the mountains near Luang Prabang. P. LEWIS & E.
LEWIS, PEOPLES OF THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE 102 (1984). The Hmong are a very independent
people. They felt threatened by the communist movements in Laos and consequently were
willing to take up arms to resist. Id. at 10. Their support of United States efforts and their
continued resistance to communism have resulted in Lao governmental and Vietnamese perse-
cution. Moreover, due to their relative wealth from opium production, they are resented by
the lowland Lao. See Ely, The American War In Indochina, Part II, supra note 20, at 1095
n.11.
For an extensive account of CIA activity with the Hmong in Laos and the CIA's alleged
involvement in opium trafficking, see A. McCoy, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 242-353 (1972). McCoy suggested that the Hmong were so vital to CIA efforts in Laos
that the CIA felt compelled to assist in distributing the tribe's major source of income.
Wartime conditions had increased [Hmong] dependence on [opium] cultivation, and
the lack of air transport created serious economic problems for hill tribe opium farm-
ers. Since the CIA was using the [Hmong] population to combat Pathet Lao forces
in the mountains of northeastern Laos, the prosperity and well being of this tribe was
of paramount importance to the agency's success ....
Without air transport for their opium, the [Hmong] faced economic ruin. There
was simply no form of air transport available in Northern Laos except the CIA's
charter airline, Air America. And according to several sources, Air America began
flying opium from mountain villages north and east of the Plain of Jars to Gen. Vang
Pao's headquarters at Long Tieng.
A. McCoY, supra, at 263.
56. STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 16; see WHITAKER, supra
note 22, at 278; see also Ely, The American War in Indochina. Part II, supra note 20, at 1095.
The Thai irregulars are transported from Thailand to Laos by Air America and are
returned to Thailand when their tours are up again by Air America. We were told
that the Embassy wanted to [deleted] the [deleted] with [deleted] because the [de-
leted] were more mobile and thus "could do things the others could not do."... The
need for Thai "volunteers" results from the fact that the military manpower base in
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Vang Pao.57 These forces supplemented the Royal Lao Army by en-
gaging in secret guerrilla warfare against the Pathet Lao and the
North Vietnamese Army.58
One CIA-supported operation was particularly important to the
entire Vietnam War effort. From 1965 to 1968, the United States op-
erated a secret radar station on a mountain called Phou Pha Thi in
northern Laos, 17 miles from the North Vietnamese border and only
160 miles from Hanoi.59 The installation, run by twelve Americans
Laos is estimated to be 114,765 and the Lao Army, neutralist army, irregulars and
Pathet Lao all must draw from this base which is now exhausted.... Thus addi-
tional military manpower can only come outside Laos.
STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 16 (the notation "[deleted]" appears
in the original). According to one commentator, 99 Thai police commandos worked with the
Hmong under the CIA in Laos. A. McCoy, supra note 55, at 275.
57. STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 14-17; Laos: The Unseen
Presence, TIME, Oct. 17, 1969, at 39; Laos: Another Vietnam?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1970, at
42. In 1960, the CIA began organizing an army of Hmong tribesmen in Laos to combat
increasing guerrilla activity in Laos and South Vietnam. In this way, the United States was
able to control the effort to resist communist insurgency in Laos without using troops. A.
McCoy, supra note 55, at 265. To command this army, the CIA needed "a real slugger who
would take casualties." Id. at 268. They chose Vang Pao, a young Hmong officer whose
paramilitary experience began when he was thirteen years old. A lieutenant colonel in the Lao
Army, he also commanded the Hmong self-defense forces in the Plain of Jars. Id. at 268, 271.
Today, Vang Pao is a naturalized United States citizen. Sesser, supra note 7, at 62.
58. STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 14-17. General Vang Pao's
clandestine army was considered superior to the regular army. The Royal Army was com-
manded by generals in the various regions. These generals were tantamount to "warlords,"
each with his own idea of how the war should be fought. Id. at 14. As a result, the authorities
in Vientiane were not able to mobilize troops as easily as they wished. Such a decentralized
army was weak and largely ineffective. Furthermore, most of the Lao regular army was used
to guard populated areas, airfields, and depots. Id. By contrast, the CIA-backed, clandestine
forces were free to mobilize as General Pao wished. Indeed, these secret forces were trans-
ported in and out of Laos by Air America. Id. at 16. For more on Air America, see Air
America: Anything Goes, NEWSWEEK, April 6, 1970, at 37. On the need for secrecy, the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee staff reported:
The principal arguments we heard for the need to continue to maintain secrecy were
these: first, that General Vang Pao does not want to allow the press to visit because
his military security would be compromised; second, that if reporters were permitted
to visit Long Tieng, they would concentrate on the role of the United States, over-
looking Vang Pao's contribution; third, that CIA [sic] is a clandestine organization
not used to operating in the open and that its operations in other parts of the world
might be compromised if the techniques and individuals involved in Laos were to
become known; fourth, that were U.S. activities publicized, the United States would
be accused of violating the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and it would thus be more
difficult to re-establish the Geneva Agreements as a framework for a future settle-
ment in Laos; and fifth, that the details of the Thai presence would become known
which would [deleted].
STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 16-17 (the notation "[deleted]" ap-
pears in the original).
59. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
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and protected by roughly 100 Hmong tribesmen of General Vang
Pao's army,60 guided United States bombing missions over North
Vietnam.6 1
The North Vietnamese Army attached great strategic impor-
tance to the radar station. 62 The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
forces mobilized far more troops than were ultimately necessary to
overrun the station.63 Many of the excess troops spilled over onto the
Plain of Jars, creating the impression that they were conducting an
offensive. 64 Washington interpreted this North Vietnamese thrust as
aggression and used the situation to justify an increase in United
States military assistance to Laos.65 By venturing onto the Plain of
Jars, the North Vietnamese troops became dispersed and vulnerable.66
21, at 21. The secrecy of the installation was evident in the following questions by Senators
Fong and Kennedy directed at William H. Sullivan, former United States ambassador to Laos,
during the hearing of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and
Escapees.
Senator FONG. So our activity is confined to bombing. No infantry men, no foot
soldiers; is that correct?
Ambassador SULLIVAN. Some of our military personnel are there in an advisory
capacity, but they are not engaged in combat and they are under strict instructions to
disengage if the area falls into a combat situation.
Senator KENNEDY. By your response to Senator Fong's questions, you don't mean
to suggest that we haven't put in very sensitive installations such as the one at Phou
Pha Thi which has been reported in the press as a secret installation to guide Ameri-
can bombing in North Vietnam. You don't want to leave us with the impression that
the only thing that our advisers were doing was just "advising" and not operating
very sensitive and highly classified and extremely important offensive equipment?
Ambassador SULLIVAN. We had that one, and that one only, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. But that was a significant one, was it not?
Ambassador SULLIVAN. Yes, it was.
Senator KENNEDY. And after that was destroyed, we stopped the bombing of the
North, did we not, 2 weeks afterward?
Ambassador SULLIVAN. I can't remember the exact date, but it was in the same time
frame.
Senator KENNEDY. So to suggest that the only action or activity of these advisers
was to sort of help and assist these [Hmong] tribesmen is not a very complete or fair
characterization of our involvement there, is it?
Ambassador SULLIVAN. No, I wouldn't want to leave the impression that that is all
they have done since they have been there. That is their main burden.
Id. at 22.
60. Id. at 21; A. McCoy, supra note 55, at 278.
61. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra
note 21, at 22; A. McCoy, supra note 55, at 278.
62. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 22.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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A counteroffensive launched by Royal Lao forces and General Vang
Pao, and supported by United States aerial bombing, easily re-estab-
lished control of the Plain of Jars.67 However, in taking the Plain,
General Vang Pao, like the North Vietnamese, overextended his
forces. Consequently, the Communists soon recaptured the Plain.68
These sudden changes in control of the Plain transformed Laos' nu-
merous seesaw battles into a major war.
69
By 1969, the United States officially admitted only to conducting
reconnaissance missions over Laos. 70 The planes engaged in those
missions were supposedly authorized to fire only in self-defense.71
United States planes had in fact provided tactical air support to the
Royal Lao forces and repeatedly bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail.72
One United States official in Vientiane articulated the concern over
publicly admitting to the United States bombing, saying:
If we [acknowledged it] .... every dove in the U.S. would hit us
over the head with it like they did with Johnson and the bombing
of North Viet Nam. The North Vietnamese don't admit the pres-
ence of their 47,000 troops. Why should we give them the advan-
tage of admitting the bombing?73
The official United States position possibly reflected concern that
United States assistance to Laos may have violated the 1962 Geneva
accords declaring Laos' neutrality.
74
In 1970, the United States finally acknowledged a more active
military role in Laos. President Nixon defended the bombing as a
response to communist aggression on the Plain of Jars.75 Nixon de-
scribed the United States' aerial military campaign over Laos with
such euphemisms as "limited," "requested," "supportive," and "de-
fensive."' 76 The President insisted that the United States had simply
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 21, 22; Laos: Plain (and Fancy) Talk, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1970, at 34.
70. Laos: The Unseen Presence, TIME, Oct. 17, 1969, at 39.
71. Id.
72. Id. One United States Air Force pilot said, "We've creamed that place, ... some
places even worse than Viet Nam." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Nixon Statement, supra note 3, at 358-60.
76. Id. In the speech, President Nixon stated:
I turn now to the precise nature of our aid to Laos .... I have indicated:
-That the United States has no ground combat forces in Laos.
-That there were 50,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos and that "more perhaps
are coming."
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responded to Royal Lao Government requests for assistance." Nixon
admitted the bombing but did not mention the radar station at Phou
Pha Thi. Meanwhile, North Vietnam insisted that the installation's
presence necessitated its invasion of the Plain of Jars. 78
B. Extent of the Bombing
Many groups have attempted to estimate the scope of the bomb-
ing of Laos.79 Some unofficial accounts suggest that at its peak in
1968 and 1969, United States bombing of Laos surpassed the level of
United States bombing in Europe and the South Pacific during World
War 11.80 Indeed, it is considered "the heaviest sustained bombing
campaign in history." ' These reports indicate that the bombs were
directed primarily at the civilian population8 2 in an effort to demoral-
-That, at the request of the Royal Laotian Government which was set up by the
Geneva Accords of 1962, we have provided logistical and other assistance to that
government for the purpose of helping it to prevent the Communist conquest of
Laos.
-That we have used air power for the purpose of interdicting the flow of North
Vietnamese troops and supplies on that part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail which runs
through Laos.
-LThat, at the request of the Royal Laotian Government, we have flown reconnais-
sance missions in Northern Laos in support of the Laotian Government's efforts to
defend itself against North Vietnamese aggression and that we were engaged in
"some other activities."
Id. at 359.
77. Id. at 359-60.
78. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 21.
79. Id. at 29; Sesser, supra note 7, at 40; Strock, Laotian Tragedy: The Long March, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 9, 1970, at 12; Laos: Another Vietnam?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1970, at 42.
80. Hearings, supra note 1, at 89-90 (Appendix II, prepared by Fred Branfman). Mr.
Branfman spent four years in Laos interviewing Laotian refugees and United States military
personnel. Id. at 89. He compiled documentation in the form of interview transcriptions and
excerpts from articles written by other researchers, including United Nations Advisor Georges
Chapelier and Jacques Decornoy, Southeast Asia desk editor of Le Monde, who visited North-
ern Laos and witnessed the bombing first hand. Id. at 89-91. Professor Ely reports that the
United States dropped 1.6 million tons of bombs on Laos. Ely, The American War in Indo-
china, Part II, supra note 20, at 1098. Other reports indicate that the United States dropped
over 2 million tons of bombs on Laos. Sesser, supra note 7, at 40.
81. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II, supra note 20, at 1098 (quoting A.
ISAACS, G. HARDY & M. BROWN, PAWNS OF WAR: CAMBODIA AND LAOS 72 (1987)).
82. Hearings, supra note 1, at 90-113. Professor Ely suggests that the United States was
"less restrained in ... killing civilians" in Laos because the war there was a secret. Ely, The
American War in Indochina, Part II, supra note 20, at 1098 n.33. "While as in any war,
atrocities were not uncommon, the military did exercise caution in conducting ground and air
operations [in Vietnam] in order to minimize civilian casualties. The difference can be seen in
the 'gloves off' bombing in Laos where the cameras were not watching." Id. (quoting L.
GELB & R. BETTS, THE IRONY OF VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED 266 (1979)).
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ize the Lao people and turn them against the Pathet Lao.8 3
United States bombing of Laos occurred in four phases.84 Phase
I, from May 1964 to October 1966, consisted of sporadic missions by
Laotian T-28 aircraft,85 directed primarily at enemy troops in the jun-
gles.86 Phase II lasted from autumn 1966 to early 1968.87 It involved
the use of United States planes which bombed enemy-held or
threatened villages, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties.
88
Phase III ran from the middle to the end of 1968, just after the bomb-
ing of North Vietnam had subsided. 89 This phase also saw the use of
more United States than Laotian planes and an increased targeting of
civilian populated areas.90 Phase IV began in early 1969, after the
bombing of North Vietnam had completely terminated and involved a
substantial increase in the bombing of Laos.91 By the time the bomb-
ing stopped in 1973, United States planes had flown 580,944 sorties, 92
averaging 177 sorties a day, "or one planeload of bombs every eight
minutes around the clock for nine years."
'93
Although the United States ambassador in Vientiane theoreti-
cally directed all bombing missions,94 a staff report to a Senate sub-
committee indicates that this was not the case.
Evidence in the field suggests that, although the U.S. Embassy in
83. Hearings, supra note 1, at 90. "[I]t was decided to bomb civilian targets in an attempt
to demoralize the civilian population, deprive the Pathet Lao of indigenous food supplies, force
them to employ civilians to do porterage, kill off potential recruits and porters, and cause a
population flow away from their zones." Id.
84. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 29; Hearings, supra note 1, at 6 (Sen. Edward Kennedy questioning Rep. Paul McClos-
key, Jr.).
85. Trainer aircraft converted into light attack aircraft. Hammond, U.S. Intervention
and the fall of Diem, in THE VIETNAM WAR: THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 66, 67 (R. Bonds ed. 1988).
86. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 29.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. During the first nine months of 1969, the United States Air Force and Navy were
conducting four hundred sorties per day. WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 278.
92. A sortie is "one mission or attack by a single military airplane." WEBSTER'S NEW
TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1733 (2d ed. 1983).
93. Sesser, supra note 7, at 40.
94. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Paul McCloskey, Jr.); WHITAKER,
supra note 22, at 278. In fact "the validating and monitoring of air strikes" was usually di-
rected by a junior Foreign Service Officer acting on the ambassador's behalf. STAFF REPORT
ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 30.
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Vientiane has both the technical means and necessary information
to validate and monitor air strikes by U.S. aircraft, the sheer vol-
ume and constancy of bombing activity since 1968 makes effective
control of these strikes almost impossible .... The result is that, as
critics have long argued, "free fire" zones are not uncommon in
Laos and the military had de facto daily control over American
bombing-not the American Ambassador, nor, for that matter, the
Royal Lao Government.
95
Mistakes were inevitable. A staff report prepared for another Senate
subcommittee confirms that Lao civilians were often the victims of
bombing by the United States.
There are plenty of instances known to American civilian employ-
ees who have been in Laos for some years in which civilian targets
have been bombed. There is a certain reluctance, especially on the
part of the Air Force, to admit that mistakes have happened which
tends to undermine the credibility of official claims made about the
infallibility of the conduct of the air war in Laos.
96
95. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 30.
96. STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 11. On the issue of credibil-
ity of refugee reports, note the following statement by Senator Kennedy to Congressman Mc-
Closkey during the Hearings on War-Related Civilian Problems in Indochina:
These are figures which must be, I would think, exceedingly conservative. I just
wonder what goes through a refugee's mind when he is down in a refugee camp,
which is either under the control or at least under the jurisdiction of the friendly
Laotians. When they ask him how he got there he probably doesn't say, "Well, you
fellows are the guys who put me here." I would think if he were going to try and
ingratiate himself to those who are now providing him with the tin roofing and the
wheat or the little compensations that he might get, I would think he would be talk-
ing about those terrible Communist Pathet Lao that drove him here and that they are
the bad guys. Instead, when surveyed you get an overwhelming response about
bombing-that it is the air power that has made them move. I should think that this
adds an additional degree of credibility to the observations you have made and were
able to detect from your personal conversations with refugees.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 8.
With respect to targeting "mistakes" one staff report noted:
[A] few words should be said on accidental bombing[.] . . .[T]he official record
indicates that in the period from January 1, 1967, to early May of [1970], there were
"'eight accidental bombings of friendly villages resulting in civilian casualties [97
killed and 54 wounded] or property damage, and three incidents where USAF planes
jettisoned ordnance near civilian population centers ......
How many other such raids, if any, have been carried out on friendly villages
and have not been recorded on the official list of accidental bombings, is not fully
known.
... [I]t is of interest to note that the list only records bombing accidents over
friendly villages. Presumably, such accidents have also occurred over unfriendly vil-
lages, the nature and scope of which will never be fully known.
STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J [Vol. 13:133
As a free-lance researcher and journalist, Fred Branfman spent
four years in Laos where he interviewed United States pilots and offi-
cials, as well as Laotian refugees.97 These interviews suggest two ba-
sic reasons for the United States' bombing of civilian targets.98 First,
because villages tended to be in the open, they were the easiest targets
to identify from the air.99 The regions controlled by the Pathet Lao
were densely wooded,I°° and the guerrillas stayed in the forest where
they were not easily detected. 10 Moreover, those military targets that
were identifiable were difficult to hit by jets flying 600 miles-per-hour
at an altitude of five thousand feet.'0 2 The second reason for bombing
civilian targets was to destroy the civilian infrastructure of the Pathet
Lao regions.10 3 This eroded moral support and depleted the supply of
potential military recruits.
The United States' bombing of civilian targets leveled virtually
every village on the Plain of Jars. 104 Villagers were forced to live in
jungle caves and did not dare to go out during the day. 10 5 They feared
that if they were seen by aircraft flying overhead they would be
bombed again. 10 6 Consequently, the little farming that was possible
31. For statistics on the eight friendly villages accidently bombed, see id. at 77 (Appendix
VI).
97. Documentation from his interviews was included in the report of hearings before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with
Refugees and Escapees held on April 21 and 22, 1971. Hearings, supra note 1, at 89.
98. Id. at 90.
99. Id.
100. Id.; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 17-18.
101. Hearings, supra note 1, at 90.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 15; WHITAKER, supra note 22, at 1. "Nothing stood on the earth,. . . [e]very
building was destroyed." Sesser, supra note 7, at 41.
105. Hearings, supra note 1, at 101-13; STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR
CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 29; Sesser, supra note 7, at 41.
106. Hearings, supra note 1, at 108. "During the bombing, if the planes couldn't select a
place to bomb, but they saw some animals or people, they would simply drop the bombs on
them." Id. at 95 (excerpt from Decornoy, Owls in the Grotto, LE MONDE, July 1968). As the
Southeast Asian Desk editor for Le Monde, Jacques Decornoy visited Laos in 1968. Id. at 90.
The accounts of his trip appeared in a five-part series in Le Monde in July, 1968. Id. He is one
of the few Westerners to experience the bombing of Laos first-hand.
From a refugee interview, conducted by Fred Branfman:
Q. Did the planes also destroy things other than the houses or the people? Did
they destroy any of the water buffalo or anything else?
A. He says they didn't know the difference between a person and a water buf-
falo. If they saw anything moving they'd shoot.
Q. You mean they'd strafe the water buffalo?
A. He says if they had bombs left over, then they'd bomb the buffalo.
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was done at night. 0 7
C. The Present Situation
Farmers on the Plain of Jars in northeastern Laos use a hoe to
till the soil. Swung high above the head and driven into the earth, the
hoe digs into the soil and turns it over. I08 If the farmer is unlucky,
the blade may strike an unexploded anti-personnel cluster bomb and
he may lose his legs or even his life. 109
The cluster bombs, which United States airplanes dropped, con-
sisted of a large canister or "mother bomb""10 filled with hundreds of
smaller bombi."' Before hitting the earth, the canister would split
Id. at 106.
107. Id. at 101-13. United Nations advisor Georges Chapelier wrote:
Prior to 1967, bombings were light and far from populated centers. By 1968 the
intensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages.
The villagers moved to the outskirts and then deeper and deeper into the forest as the
bombing climax reached its peak in 1969 when jet planes came daily and destroyed
all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches
and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. All of the interlocutors, without
any exception, had his village completely destroyed. In the last phase, bombings
were aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian society.
Id. at 92.
108. Sesser, supra note 7, at 41; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, § A, at 9, col. I (city final ed.).
109. Sesser, supra note 7, at 41; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, § A, at 9, col. I (city final ed.).
110. Hearings, supra note 1, at 94.
111. Id. at 96 n.*.
The most commonly encountered munition ... has been the cluster bomb (more
properly, bomblet), which is colloquially referred to as the "guava" bomb... and
what the Laotians have commonly referred to as the "bombie". These are packaged
for air drop in groups of perhaps 670 in a bomb-shaped dispenser... the combined
package ... being referred to as a cluster bomb unit.
The soft-metal casing of the "guava" bomb has embedded in it about 300 6
millimeter diameter steel balls which fly out in all directions when the bomblet ex-
plodes, with a lethal radius of over 5 meters. The dispenser is designed to split open
before it reaches the ground so that the bomblets become distributed over an area of
perhaps 0.5 hectare or more....
The second most commonly encountered munition ... has been the so-called
"pineapple" bomb which is packaged for air drop in groups of 360 .... These are
cylindrical bomblets with stabilizing fins whose soft-metal walls each contain about
250 small steel balls.
Several other types of small fragmentation munition ... were also commonly
dropped on Laos as cluster bomb units. The colloquially named 'orange' bomb ....
weighing 730 grams, was designed to penetrate a jungle canopy and reach the ground
before exploding. Here fragments of the casing, rather than embedded pellets, cause
the damage. The so-called 'butterfly' bomb, weighing about 1.8 kilograms, was also
dispensed in a cluster bomb unit. Another bomblet that was used... is similar in
appearance to the 'guava' bomb but somewhat larger, weighs 1.0 kilogram, and is a
combination fragmentation/incendiary device.
Also dropped in huge numbers for purposes of area denial were tiny anti-person-
nel mines referred to as 'dragontooth' mines .... These minelets are blast weapons
weighing only about 20 grams each, but when stepped on are capable of tearing off
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.i [Vol. 13:133
open and scatter its contents.1 2 The smaller bombi did not explode,
but simply lay in wait for a victim.l" 3
The danger that the unexploded bombi pose is not limited to the
farmer plowing his fields; children are often unsuspecting victims.
The bombi are shaped like local fruits. When children find them lying
on the ground they often pick them up and play with them." 4 Unfor-
tunately, their game is a short one.
Official statistics on the exact number of casualties are not avail-
able.'l5 Private North American relief agencies presently in Laos re-
port that hundreds have been killed or injured." 6 In the first five
years following the bombing, 267 people were killed and 343 others
injured in Xieng Khouang province alone."17 More recently, during
the first six months of 1988, ten people were killed and another twelve
were injured by bombi on the Plain of Jars.18
Although the Lao and United States governments are aware of
the problem,' '9 no systematic clearing of the land has occurred. 20 In
fact, when the Lao clear land to construct a building or a new road,
bombi are usually removed by hand.121 Visible bombi are collected,
the foot. A cluster bomb unit contains about 4,800 dragontooth mines. Also much
used was the 'spider' mine.., which looks similar to the "guava" bomb, but sends
out eight trip wires after being dropped and is not meant to go off until these are
disturbed.
Martin & Hiebert, Explosive Remnants, in PEACE SEC. NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 5-6 (ex-
cerpting from EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR: MITIGATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
(A. Westing ed. 1985)) [hereinafter Martin].
The military term for the bombi is "bomb live unit" or "BLU." Krepon, Weapons Poten-
tially Inhumane: The Case of Cluster Bombs, in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 267 (R. Falk ed. 1976).
112. L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1 (bulldog ed.); Nalty, The Air War on
the Laotian Supply Routes, in THE VIETNAM WAR: THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE
CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 164, 168 (R. Bonds ed. 1988).
113. Hearings, supra note 1, at 94.
114. See id. at 96 n.*.
115. L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1 (bulldog ed.).
116. Id.
117. Martin, supra note 111, at 5; Sesser, supra note 7, at 42. "In Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince, on the Plain of Jars, anywhere from five to ten people are killed or injured by bombis
every month." Id. Xieng Khouang is one of sixteen provinces in Laos. See STAFF REPORT
ON REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 18. The district
leader of Xepon district reports that bombi have killed at least three people a year in his
district since 1975. Sesser, supra note 7, at 44.
118. L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1 (bulldog ed.).
119. L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, Part I, at 5, col. 1.
120. L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. I (bulldog ed.).
121. Martin, supra note I l, at 6.
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gingerly carried to a pit, and then detonated. 122
One private relief organization has attempted to deal with the
problem. 23 With permission from the Lao government, it has em-
ployed a specially-rigged tractor to seek out and detonate bombi.'24
However, despite a protective shield on the tractor, few people are
willing to operate the machine. 25 Furthermore, United States diplo-
mats in both Laos and Thailand have warned that the tractor's use
could be dangerous. 26 They fear that larger unexploded bombs also
buried in the soil could easily be detonated by the device. 27
III. EXISTING STATUTORY REMEDIES
Laotian victims of these bombs contemplating legal action
against the United States government are initially faced with the well-
settled rule of law that the federal government is immune from suit
without its consent. 28 This doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
originated with the English concept that "the King can do no
wrong,"' 29 has become a fundamental principle of United States
law.' 30 Congress, however, may waive this federal immunity, '3' as it
122. "Lao soldiers with long experience with ordnance have discovered that guavas can be
carried, safely when the center seam is held in a particular position relative to the ground."
Swartzendruber, Picking Up the Pieces in Laos, in PEACE SEC. NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 3.
However, not all the bombi can be safely carried in this manner. No one is quite sure why
some bombi can be carried and others simply explode when disturbed. Id.
Individual bombi can be destroyed by placing them in a hole with dynamite. An electric
current is then used to detonate the dynamite and destroy the bombi. Zimmerly, Mr. Boua
Van and the Bombies, in PEACE SEC. NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at insert.
123. Swartzendruber, supra note 122, at 3.
124. Id. at 2.
The British-made International Harvester 674 tractor, with its custom-built steel and
plexiglass cab, is designed to attack guava bombs .... About 200 kilos of chain,
attached in two-foot lengths to a hydraulic-powered axle, beat the ground ahead of
the tractor in an attempt to simulate the force of hand hoeing, a common cause of
accidental bombie explosions .... The flail [sic] is hooded by a sheet metal shield,
reinforced by a second layer at the crucial section facing the tractor. The tractor's
power take-off runs a rear attachment called a rotavator, a heavy-duty tilling device
consisting of rotating, four-inch blades, designed to clear thick brush, crop residues
and pasture land. A shield welded to the front of the rotavator protects the tractor
and driver from explosions in the rear.
Id. at 2-3.
125. L.A. Times, June 26, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1 (bulldog ed.).
126. Swartzendruber, supra note 122, at 3.
127. Id. "One official stated flatly that amateurs' use of a tractor was 'the wrong way to
do it-we're not going to be part of it.' " Id.
128. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
129. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (1924).
130. Sovereign immunity was first applied on behalf of the states. In Chisholm v. Georgia,
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did by enacting the FTCA and the FCA. Both statutes may allow
potential suits against the United States under circumstances applica-
ble to the injured Lao.
A. Federal Tort Claims Act
An action for damages by Laotian villagers against the United
States 132 might fall within the Federal Tort Claims Act. 13 3 Passed by
Congress in 1946, the FTCA provides the federal government's gen-
eral consent to be sued in tort. 34 The Act gives the federal district
the Supreme Court sustained federal court jurisdiction of a suit by a citizen of North Carolina
against the State of Georgia. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The idea that one state's citizen
could sue another state without the latter's consent created such shock and surprise that the
eleventh amendment was passed granting the states immunity from suit in federal courts.
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 320-23 (1934). While the language of the eleventh
amendment did not expressly prohibit suit in federal court against a state by its own citizen,
the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana held that an unconsenting state was immune from suit
by its own citizen. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In 1846, the Court expressly ruled that the federal
government cannot be sued without its consent. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
286, 287-88 (1846). This principle had been stated in dicta as early as 1834. United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941); United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Vain v. United States, 708 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1983);
Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Colo. 1981);
Kelley v. Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 181, 182 (W.D. La. 1977).
132. Another potential defendant in such a case would be the manufacturers of the bombs.
These private defendants could be sued on a products liability theory. The argument would be
simply that the bombs were designed to last too long for their intended use. The purpose of
these bombs was to destroy enemy targets or kill enemy personnel. Although strategy might
dictate that a bomb lie dormant for a period of time and the target not be destroyed immedi-
ately, one can hardly suggest that twenty years is a reasonable period of dormancy.
A few years ago, suing the manufacturer might have been relatively simple, but in 1988,
the United States Supreme Court, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988),
extended the protection of the federal government's sovereign immunity to independent con-
tractors performing work for the federal government. Id. at 504-07. In Boyle, a Marine heli-
copter copilot was killed when his helicopter crashed into the ocean. Boyle drowned when the
escape hatch would not open. Id. at 502. The hatch was designed to open out instead of in,
thus rendering it ineffective underwater because of outside water pressure. Id. at 503. Boyle's
family sued Sikorsky, the manufacturer that built the helicopter for the United States. Id. at
502.
The protection extended by the Court is provided to manufacturers of military equipment
when the government has approved the specifications, the equipment conforms to those specifi-
cations, and the manufacturer has warned the government of any dangers of which it is aware.
Id. at 512. The effects of Boyle are to shield the manufacturers of the bombs and apply the
FTCA exceptions to the manufacturers as well as to government defendants.
133. The FTCA has been held to allow actions by alien claimants. In United States v.
South Carolina Highway Dep't, the court noted that the statute's language does not limit its
applicability to United States citizens. 171 F.2d 893, 899 (4th Cir. 1948).
134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-2680 (1982).
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court jurisdiction to hear certain claims against the United States gov-
ernment. 135 However, if the district court concludes that the case
before it fits into one of the Act's many exceptions,136 the court will
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The exceptions which may
deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to hear cases for injuries result-
ing from the government's activities in Laos during the Vietnam War
are the foreign country exception, the combatant activities exception,
and the discretionary functions exception. '
37
1. Theories of Tort Liability
The FTCA provides a cause of action against the federal govern-
ment in tort. When applying the statute, it is necessary to first iden-
tify potential tort theories before considering the possible exceptions.
There are several theories that Laotian persons who were recently in-
jured or killed by bombs dropped during the Vietnam War might as-
sert to recover damages against the United States.
a. Deliberate and Intentional Bombing of Civilians
To the extent that the bombing of civilian targets in Laos was
deliberate, those acts and the decisions to execute those acts consti-
tuted intentional torts resulting in personal injury and wrongful
death. The FTCA, while exempting certain intentional torts, allows
recovery for wrongful death. 38 Section 1346(b) provides that the
135. Section 1346(b) states:
[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, ... for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
136. The exceptions to the FTCA are: 1) discretionary functions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); 2)
negligent transmission of letters or postal matter, § 2680(b); 3) tax and customs claims,
§ 2680(c); 4) admiralty claims, § 2680(d); 5) claims relating to the Trading with the Enemy
Act, § 2680(e); 6) claims arising out of United States imposed quarantines, § 2680(f); 7) speci-
fied intentional torts, § 2680(h); 8) claims arising out of government regulation of the mone-
tary system, § 2680(i); 9) combatant activities, § 2680(j); 10) foreign countries, § 2680(k); 11)
Panama Canal Company activities, § 2680(m); and 12) activities of federal land banks, federal
intermediate credit banks, or banks for cooperatives, § 2680(n). (28 U.S.C. § 2680(g) has been
repealed.)
137. These three exceptions will be discussed in detail below.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). "Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights" is not actionable under the Act. Id.
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United States is liable in tort "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 139
Although the common law did not recognize a tort action once a vic-
tim died, each of the states now has a wrongful death statute. 140
These state statutes are generally "held to cover intentional, as well as
negligent" wrongful death torts.' 4' Because the decision to deliber-
ately bomb civilian targets was made in Washington, D.C., the appli-
cable wrongful death statute would be the District of Columbia's,
which covers intentional torts.
142
b. Mistake
If the bombing of civilian targets was accidental, as the United
States government has claimed, I43 there may have been negligence at
the day-to-day decisional level in Laos, or on the part of those operat-
ing the United States aircraft. For example, negligent conduct by the
junior Foreign Service Officer'" in charge of targeting decisions at the
United States embassy in Vientiane could have resulted in accidental
bombings. Moreover, negligence on the part of United States pilots or
navigational officers operating the bombers may also have contributed
to accidents. Finally, negligence by United States ground crew could
have caused mechanical malfunctions on the aircraft, resulting in in-
accurate drops. It is entirely possible, however, that individuals in the
aircraft intentionally bombed civilian targets contrary to orders, ren-
dering the tort intentional and not merely a mistake.
c. Use of Cluster Bombs
Whether the bombing was intentional or accidental, cluster
bombing itself might be considered negligent. Although such bombs
were used in the Korean War, their destructive capabilities were not
fully realized until the Vietnam War.145 Extensive military testing be-
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
140. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 945 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
141. Id. at 946.
142. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1981).
143. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
144. See STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 30.
145. Krepon, supra note 11l, at 268.
Upon detonation, each dispenser can blanket an oval, linear, or figure-eight patterned
area on the ground. The shower of fragmentation can be effective against light mili-
tary targets, but for the most part the CBU [cluster bomb unit] is effective only
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gan in 1966.'" The results were so favorable that the military imme-
diately sought to deploy the bombs. 147 The debate over their use was
minimal and confined almost exclusively to military circles.' 48 The
major issue was whether the great military advantage gained by using
the cluster bomb outweighed the risks of revealing the weapon's tech-
nology to the enemy. 149 This matter was resolved when proponents
noted that the technology involved was so simple that enemies were
sure to develop cluster bombs independently. 50 Consequently, the
weapon was not classified as a military secret.' 5' One commentator
noted the significance of non-classification, stating:
To have [classified the bombs] would almost automatically have
brought in a wider array of civilians and compelled some discus-
sion of the political consequences of deploying a weapon that was
not only far more effective than any previous one, but also far more
likely to cause civilian casualties. It appears that in this and other
respects the military promoters of the weapon went to considerable
lengths not to raise the broader questions. 152
Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently endured a
bitter policy debate with civilians in the Department of Defense over
the deployment of napalm.'5 3 They were not eager to engage in an-
other bureaucratic dogfight over cluster bombs. Thus, the Joint
Chiefs never formally requested political authority to use the
weapon.'5 4 This meant that "[tihere was virtually no debate at tech-
against human beings. Because of the high velocity of the fragments and the uni-
formity of their dispersion, it is a virtual certainty that any person located within the
pattern area will be killed or wounded.
Id. at 267-68.
146. Id. at 269.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 270.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 270-71.
154. According to [Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, former Director of Operations
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff] ..... In our view, they were a purely conventional
weapon, and we regarded them as available, and the less said, the better. Somebody
somewhere would want to raise the argument, 'Well, do we or don't we want to
authorize the use of this weapon?'.. . We in J-3 [Directorate for Operations] had
ways of exchanging information with our subordinate echelons all the way out to
pilots on the line, and we just said, 'As far as we know, that's authorized to you,
you've got 'em, use 'em when you want, and keep your mouth shut, or somebody will
tell you that you can't.'"
Id. at 271.
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nical or policy-making levels about the indiscriminate nature of the
munition and mechanics for monitoring its use."1 55
The history of this decision-making process in deploying cluster
bomb units suggests that the military exercised little care in determin-
ing the weapon's effect on the civilian population. The major concern
was that the cluster bombs would save the lives of United States pi-
lots.1 56 Although this was a valid concern, it should not have been the
only one. A more careful inquiry might have revealed that the bombs
had a potential active life of more than twenty-five years.
d. Failure to Remove
The United States' failure to return to the battlefields after the
war to assist in removing the bombi from the soil might also be con-
sidered tortious conduct. As the Vietnam War ended, the United
States public was not inclined to worry about conditions in Southeast
Asia. 5 7 Although some commentators called for humanitarian aid to
that region through international and private relief agencies, there
was little actual commitment from the United States government. 58
Failing to remove the bombi might be actionable under the
FTCA if the bombi's presence constituted a trespass or a nuisance.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a trespass has oc-
curred if an object originally placed on land with the consent of the
landowner, or by privilege, is not removed when the consent is with-
drawn or the privilege terminates.' 59 Arguably, the United States
possessed a form of privilege as a combatant in the Vietnam War.
This privilege, however, would have terminated as soon as the hostili-
ties ceased and the United States pulled out of Indochina. Under this
scenario, a trespass would have occurred when the United States left
155. Id. at 274.
156. Id. at 271-72.
157. Falk, Vietnam: The Final Deceptions, in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1021 (Falk ed. 1976).
158. Id.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 160 (1965) states:
A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure,
chattel, or other thing which the actor or his predecessor in legal interest has placed
on the land
(a) with the consent of the person then in possession of the land, if the actor
fails to remove it after the consent has been effectively terminated, or
(b) pursuant to a privilege conferred on the actor irrespective of the possessor's
consent, if the actor fails to remove it after the privilege has been terminated, by the
accomplishment of its purpose or otherwise.
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and did not make reasonable efforts to remove its ordnance from Lao-
tian soil.
An even stronger argument can be made under a nuisance the-
ory. The bombi buried in the ground in Laos may constitute a public
nuisance because they unreasonably interfere with the general public's
right to safety. 60 Although the interference the bombs caused in the
late 1960s may have been reasonable, it is no longer reasonable today.
Additionally, the threat posed by the bombs has been of a continuing
nature and has created a permanent threat to the public. Further-
more, the United States has ample reason to know that the ordnance
it left behind has had, and is continuing to have, this harmful effect.
The bombi may also constitute a private nuisance, as they are "a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in private use and enjoyment
of land.' 6' The Laotian farmer's interest in the use and enjoyment of
his land has clearly been adversely affected by the bombi's presence. 162
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) states:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public
right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety. ... or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent
or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
effect upon the public right.
Id.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). The term "nontrespassory"
means that interference with the landowner's possession is not required. Unlike a trespass,
which is "an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land," a nuisance is merely
the interference with use and enjoyment of land. Id. § 821D comment (d) at 101. Indeed,
trespass and nuisance are not mutually exclusive as actions.
If the interference with the use and enjoyment of the land is a significant one, suffi-
cient in itself to amount to a private nuisance, the fact that it arises out of or is
accompanied by a trespass will not prevent recovery for the nuisance, and the action
may be maintained upon either basis as the plaintiff elects or both.
Id § 821D comment (e) at 102.
162.- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D comment (a) at 100 (1979). Comment
(b) to § 821D states in part:
The phrase "interest in the use and enjoyment of land".., comprehends not only the
interests that a person may have in the actual present use of land for residential,
agricultural, commercial, industrial and other purposes, but also his interests in hav-
ing the present use value of the land unimpaired by changes in its physical condi-
tion .... "Interest in use and enjoyment" also comprehends the pleasure, comfort
and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land.
Clearly the Laotian farmer's interest in the agricultural use of his land has been impaired by
the presence or potential presence of bombi in his soil. Moreover, the pleasure and comfort he
derives from his land is substantially limited by the omnipresent threat to his life.
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The success of these tort theories depends on whether enough
facts can be proven to establish a prima facie case of liability. 163 As-
suming that a plaintiff can overcome this burden, a number of serious
jurisdictional and immunity problems remain.
2. Foreign Country Exception
Once a tort theory has been established, the next inquiry is
whether the action is precluded by one of the FTCA's exceptions.
Section 2680(k) of the FTCA states that the Act does not apply to
"[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." 64 On its face, this lan-
guage appears fatal to any claim by villagers for injury or death occur-
ring in Laos. A careful analysis of what constitutes a "claim arising
in a foreign country" however, suggests that the exception may not be
applicable to such lawsuits.
Cases interpreting this exception generally fall into two catego-
ries: those that determine where the claim actually arose, 165 and those
that consider whether to call the place at issue a foreign country. 166
Because this is not a situation where the geopolitical status of the for-
eign country is questionable, 167 or where the territory on which the
injury occurred is subject to the control of a separate sovereign, 68 this
discussion focuses on the first group of cases which deal with where
the claim originates.
In In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,169 a federal court held
that the foreign country exception did not apply to claims arising out
of a plane crash in Paris, France. 70 A Turkish Air Lines DC-10
crashed immediately after taking off from Paris, killing all passengers
and crew members. 171 Plaintiffs filed 203 separate claims in federal
163. Generally, to make out a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove that
1) the actor had a duty; 2) the duty was breached; 3) the actor's conduct or failure to act was
the proximate cause of the injury; and 4) actual harm occurred. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 140, at 164-65.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
165. See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
166. The leading case in this category is United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949). See
also Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964) (the exclusion barred a claim arising
within the United States embassy in Bangkok, Thailand); Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (holding that the exclusion barred a claim arising in Belgium while that
country was controlled by the United States military).
167. E.g., Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 240.
168. E.g., Meredith, 330 F.2d at 9.
169. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
170. Id. at 737.
171. Id. at 735.
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court. 172 These claims were subsequently consolidated by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.171
The United States' inclusion as a defendant rested on the theory that
it had wrongfully approved, certified, and inspected the plane which
had been manufactured in California. 174 The United States unsuc-
cessfully moved to dismiss the complaints under the foreign country
exception of the FTCA on the basis that the accident had occurred in
France. 175 In denying the motion, the court held that the fact that the
injury occurred in a foreign country was irrelevant. 17 6 The court ex-
plained that a claim arises where the negligence occurs, not where its
"operative effect" is felt. 177 The court concluded that because all of
the allegedly negligent conduct occurred in the United States, none of
the claims against the United States arose in a foreign country. 178
Applying this reasoning to the injuries sustained by Laotian
farmers compels a similar result. As noted earlier, the tortious con-
duct can be traced to the United States' original decision to bomb
civilians, the decision to use cluster bombs without adequate inquiry
into their effect upon civilian populations, or the decision to forego
cleanup of the region after the war. The Department of Defense pre-
sumably made the overall policy decision to conduct a bombing cam-
paign; the day-to-day decisions to bomb were made by the State
Department. 179 Although the United States ambassador in Vien-
172. Id. at 736.
173. Id.
174. In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 737.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Under the FTCA, a tort claim arises at the place where the negligent act or
omission occurred and not where the negligence had its "operative effect," (i.e., the
situs of injury) .... Thus, none of the claims against the United States for death, as
alleged in the complaints, is a "claim arising in a foreign country." All of the con-
duct, whether "act or omission," on the other hand, occurred as the result of acts
allegedly arising, i.e., occurring, in California, and, under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), re-
sulted in "claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing. . . for...
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment[.]..
Id. at 737-38.
178. Id.; but cf Eaglin v. United States Dep't of Army, 794 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1986).
Eaglin, a serviceman's civilian dependent, was injured on an Army base in West Germany
when she slipped and fell on black ice. Id. at 582. She was from Louisiana and was unfamiliar
with winter conditions. Claiming that the government failed to inform her of the dangers of
the European climate before she went overseas, she brought suit under the FTCA. Id. The
court held that the action was barred by the foreign country exception because the relationship
between her claim and the alleged omission in the United States was too tenuous. Id.
179. STAFF REPORT ON REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY PROBLEMS, supra note
21, at 29.
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tiane' 80 gave the daily orders, the decision vesting him with that
broad authority was made in Washington."8 1 Likewise, the Depart-
ment of Defense also made the decision to deploy cluster bombs in
Laos.18 2 Based on their experience with napalm, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were wary of a potentially lengthy political debate over the
weapon.' 8 3 Accordingly, they chose not to classify the cluster bomb,
thereby avoiding the policy discussion.'" These decisions made in
Washington also constituted the negligence. Similarly, the decision
not to participate in removal of the bombi was also made in Washing-
ton."" Because all of these decisions were made in Washington, the
foreign country exception to the FTCA would not apply to Laotian
tort claims.18 6
Another case that illustrates this reasoning is In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation.187 That case involved a class action suit
filed by Vietnam veterans who were exposed to the herbicide Agent
Orange during the war.'88 The plaintiffs claimed that their exposure
to the herbicide caused birth defects in their children. 189 The defend-
ant manufacturers impleaded the United States, claiming that if they
were held liable, the United States should indemnify them for some or
all of the damages owed to the plaintiffs. 190
The United States asked to be dismissed from the action on the
theory that the FTCA foreign country exception barred these claims
against it.191 The court rejected the United States' argument on two
grounds. 92 First, the court stated that the reasons for the exception
did not apply in this case.193 The FTCA provides that the controlling
180. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Paul McCloskey, Jr.).
181. Id.
182. Krepon, supra note 111, at 269.
183. Id. at 271.
184. Id. at 270.
185. The failure to make a decision with respect to removal might also constitute the negli-
gent conduct.
186. This is obviously not true with respect to those theories based on negligence of mili-
tary personnel in Laos.
187. 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), mandamus denied, 733 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984),
appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
188. Id. at 1244.
189. Id. at 1244, 1247
190. Id. at 1244.
191. Id. at 1254.
192. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1254-55.
193. Id. at 1254.
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law is that of the place where the tort occurred. 194 Congress included
the foreign country exception in order to ensure that the United States
would not be subject to the laws of a foreign country. 195 However,
where there is no danger of foreign law applying, the foreign country
exception is inapplicable.1 96
In the In re Agent Orange case, the court recognized that one of
the countries where the soldiers were exposed to the herbicide, South
Vietnam, no longer existed. 197 The other country, Cambodia, was, in
the court's eyes, an independent country in name only since it was
controlled by Vietnam. 198 The foreign country exception did not ap-
ply because there was no real danger that the law of South Vietnam or
Cambodia would be applied to determine the United States' liability
to its veterans. 199
Second, the court held that in order for the foreign country ex-
ception to control, the "act or omission of an employee of the govern-
ment" must have occurred abroad. 200 The court found that the
decisions relating to the specifications for Agent Orange and its use
were all made in the United States.20 1 The court was unable to deter-
mine whether decisions regarding the alleged negligent use of the her-
bicide were made in the United States rather than in Vietnam.20 2
However, it concluded that because the mistakes were probably omis-
sions rather than commissions, the mistakes must have occurred at
the policy-making level in Washington, rather than at the operational
level in Vietnam. 20 3
The court's reasoning in In re Agent Orange fully applies to the
potential claims of Laotian villagers. In both cases, while the "opera-
tive effect" of the tort occurred in a foreign country, the negligent
omissions by government employees occurred in the decision-making
process in Washington. 204 In the Laotian case, those omissions in-
cluded failing to discern the danger posed to civilians at that time,
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
195. Id.
196. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1254.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1254.
201. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1242.
202. Id. at 1255.
203. d.
204. The ultimate decision to bomb Laos was made at the State Department in Washing-
ton. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
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ignoring the danger civilians would face decades later, and failing to
engage in clean-up operations. 20 5 Therefore, the reasoning of the In re
Agent Orange case supports the inapplicability of the foreign country
exception to a potential Laotian action.
3. Combat Exception
Section 26800) of the FTCA states that the Act does not apply to
"[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.''2°6 Despite the
apparent applicability of this exception, there is a good argument that
the injuries suffered by the Lao did not arise out of combatant
activities.
207
In 1948, the Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. United States,208 articu-
lated two necessary conditions for applying the exception. First, the
claim must arise out of "combatant activities"; second, the combat-
ant activities must occur during time of war.2°9 Johnson involved
damage to a clam farm caused by sewage discharged from navy ships
in a Washington State bay after the war ended in the Pacific.210 Ap-
plying the second prong of its test, the court concluded that the activ-
ity in question was not connected to actual hostilities because the
ships had returned from the theater of war and were awaiting reas-
signment.211 The court added that because the war with Japan was
205. One problem the In re Agent Orange plaintiffs faced was establishing causation. In
approving a preliminary settlement agreement, the court expressed concern over the plaintiffs'
ability to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their injuries were in fact caused by
dioxin. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
The Lao have no such causality problem. There is no question that the cluster bombs are
American. Any dispute can easily be settled by locating and inspecting unexploded bombs.
Another interesting similarity between the Agent Orange cases and the Laotian bombi
situation is that both involve injuries that manifest themselves years after the alleged tortious
conduct occurred.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982).
207. In determining whether a claim arises out of combatant activities, courts have consid-
ered a wide range of issues. For example, federal courts have addressed cases involving train-
ing exercises, Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. La. 1947), atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons, In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation,
616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
905 (1988), and negligent misdiagnosis during a pre-induction physical examination, Redmond
v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. I11. 1971).
208. 170 F.2d 767, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1948).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 768.
211. Id.
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over at the time the injury occurred, there was no possibility that the
first condition could be met either.212 These two requirements will be
considered below in more detail.
a. Combatant Activities
In 1945, the federal district court in Skeels v. United States
21 3
stated that the phrase "combat activities" was intended "to denote
actual conflict, such as where the planes and other instrumentalities
were being used ... in bombing enemy occupied territory, forces or
vessels, attacking or defending against enemy forces, etc."'214 In that
case, Jasper Skeels and several friends were fishing from a boat in the
Gulf of Mexico while United States Army planes were conducting
training exercises overhead. 21 5 During the exercises, an iron pipe fell
from a plane and hit Skeels on the head, killing him.21 6 Skeels' widow
and mother together sued the United States under the FTCA. 21 7 In
allowing the suit to proceed, the court concluded that had Congress
intended the combatant activities exception to cover all activities of
the military, including training operations, it would have used the
words "war activities. 218 The words Congress actually used, "com-
batant activities," indicated that Congress meant to restrict the excep-
tion to military activities involving "the exercise of physical force.
' 219
In In re Agent Orange, the court likewise ruled that the combat-
ant activities exception is to be narrowly interpreted 220 and to be ap-
plied only to situations where United States forces are directly
engaging the enemy.22' The court employed reasoning similar to that
which it had used with the foreign country exception, stating that
"what must arise from the combatant activities is not a 'claim' but 'an
act or omission of an employee of the government.' "222 To illustrate
its point, the court hypothesized a civilian injured on a battlefield by a
malfunctioning grenade. 223 In the hypothetical, the government pro-
212. Id.
213. 72 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947).
214. Id. at 374.
215. Id. at 373.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Skeels, 72 F. Supp. at 374.
219. Id.
220. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1255.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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vided the manufacturer with incorrect specifications. According to
the court, the civilian would not be barred by the combatant activities
exception since the actionable conduct occurred in the United States,
not on the battlefield. 224 By contrast, a civilian injured by a soldier's
inaccurate toss of a grenade towards the enemy would be barred by
the exception.22
5
The first hypothetical described by the In re Agent Orange court
is very similar to the problem facing Laotian farmers. The negligence
involved in the improper grenade specifications occurred in the deci-
sion-making process, presumably by the procurement division of the
military branch in question. The government's decision was not made
in the course of direct combat with the enemy, but in Washington,
long before the battlefield injury actually occurred. Similarly, the de-
cisions to bomb Laotian villages, to utilize cluster bombs that by na-
ture would not detonate upon dispersal, and not to return to the
battlefield to assist in clean-up operations, were likewise made in
Washington years before the battlefield injuries occurred. None of
these decisions were incidental to direct engagement with the enemy.
Under the In re Agent Orange court's reasoning, Laotian villagers
would not be barred by the combatant activities exception for injuries
or death that occurred decades after direct enemy activity had ceased.
Further support for not applying the combatant activities excep-
tion to the villagers' claims is found in the meaning of the word "com-
bat." The FTCA itself contains no definition of the term.
226
However, Webster's Dictionary defines the noun "combat" as "a fight
or contest between individuals or groups. ' 227 Black's Law Dictionary
defines combat as a "forcible encounter between two or more persons;
a battle; a duel. '228
224. Id.
225. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1255.
226. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-2680 (1982). Sec-
tion 2680(j) does include the phrase "combatant activities of the military," but fails to define it.
Furthermore, Title 10 of the United States Code, entitled Armed Forces, begins by defining 45
terms used throughout the title. 10 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Although it defines terms such as
"armed forces," (§ 101(4)), "active duty," (§ 101(22)), and "Department of Defense Field Ac-
tivity," (§ 101(45)), there is no definition of "combat" or "combatant activities." Additionally,
Title 10, Chapter 6, entitled "Combatant Commands," defines only three terms in its defini-
tions section (§ 161(c)). None of these defines "combat" or "combatant activities." Id.
§§ 101, 161(c).
227. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 221 (1981).
228. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 241 (5th ed. 1979). "A forcible encounter between two
or more persons; a battle; a duel. To fight with; to struggle against." Id.
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Under these definitions, the United States' bore-bing of Laos may
well not have involved combat within the meaning of the FTCA. The
bombing of unarmed civilian villages on the Plain of Jars was more of
a unilateral action than a "contest between individuals or groups." 22
9
Although the aerial bombardment was a "forcible encounter," it was
certainly not a duel. Black's states that "a duel is any combat with
deadly weapons fought between two or more persons .... -230 This
implies active participation by both parties. Aerial bombing is not a
contest fought between bombers and villagers. The unarmed villagers
play no adversarial role as contemplated by these definitions.
Nor is bombing civilians an action taken against an enemy.
Combatant activity during a war consists of activity aimed at enemy
combatants. Activity aimed at anyone other than enemy combatants
is purely extraneous. Various reports suggest that civilian villages
were targeted in an admitted effort to demoralize the population and
turn them against the Pathet Lao.23' If this is proven, a strong argu-
ment can be made that such action aimed deliberately at non-combat-
ants constitutes non-combatant activity.
b. Activities During Time of War
Johnson held that the combatant activities exception applies only
to activities that occur during time of war. 232 This reading is consis-
tent with the language and legislative history of the FTCA. The
Committee Report accompanying the bill which later became the
FTCA explained that the measure "exempts... claims arising out of
activities of the military or naval forces or the Coast Guard during
time of war."' 233 This strongly indicates that the combatant activities
exception requires that an actual state of war exists. Hence, if the
United States military activity in and over Laos did not constitute a
war, the combatant activities exception would not shield the United
States from liability on claims brought by Laotian villagers.
229. This is supported by Laotian refugee reports that there were no Pathet Lao soldiers in
their villages when they were bombed. Hearings, supra note 1, at 90-113.
230. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (5th ed. 1979).
231. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
232. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 769-70.
233. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1945) (emphasis added).
Title I contains definitions of certain words and phrases, which make it clear that the bill
covers all federal agencies, including corporate instrumentalities, and all federal officers and
employees, including members of the military and naval forces. Section 402(11) exempts from
the bill claims arising out of activities of the military or naval forces or the Coast Guard during
time of war.
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The existence of a state of war requires no formal declaration by
Congress, but merely congressional actions signifying approval of the
executive action.234 In Morrison v. United States,235 a federal district
court held that in the context of the Vietnam War, the FTCA's com-
batant activities exception could be applied even though there was no
formal congressional declaration of war.236 There, the plaintiff was a
soldier of the United States Army in Vietnam. While inspecting a
cave, he found a container filled with $150,000 in United States cur-
rency.237 His superiors took the cash and told him that he had no
claim to it.238 When the plaintiff returned to the United States, he
unsuccessfully petitioned the Secretary of Defense for the money.
239
The plaintiff then sued the United States under the FTCA, arguing
that the combatant activities exception did not bar his claim because
the United States had not formally declared war against North Viet-
nam. 240 The court disagreed, stating that an undeclared war is as
much a war as a declared one.241 It reasoned that any other holding
would be contrary to the plain intent of the FTCA, and would subject
the United States to suit in situations in which Congress had not
meant to waive sovereign immunity.
242
234. The Supreme Court first articulated this idea in the context of the Civil War. In The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), the Court held that President Lincoln had the
authority to order a blockade of southern ports in April 1861 because of Congress' implicit
approval in earlier legislation.
If it were necessary to the technical existence of a war, that it should have a
legislative sanction, we find it in almost every act passed at the extraordinary session
of the Legislature of 1861 .... And... in 1861, we find Congress... in anticipation
of such astute objections, passing an act "approving, legalizing, and making valid all
the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, &c., as if they had been issued
and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the
United States."
Id. at 670 (emphasis omitted).
The Court analogized the situation to the earlier war with Mexico, part of which was
fought before Congress passed the Act of May 13, 1846, acknowledging a state of war against
Mexico. Id. at 668. The Court stated that the Act not only authorized continued fighting,
"but was itself a vindication and ratification of the Act of the President in accepting the chal-
lenge without a previous formal declaration of war by Congress." Id.
235. 316 F. Supp. 78 (M.D. Ga. 1970).
236. "While it may be true that a de jure state of war cannot exist without a formal decla-
ration of war, a war is no less a war because it is undeclared." Id. at 79. See also The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. at 668 ("war may exist without a declaration on either side").
237. Morrison, 316 F. Supp. at 79.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Morrison, 316 F. Supp. at 79.
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While the Morrison court may have reached the correct conclu-
sion with respect to United States military activity in Vietnam, it is
unclear whether the conflict in Laos constituted a war. 243 Contrary to
its conduct with respect to Laos, Congress repeatedly appropriated
funds to support the conflict in Vietnam.244 Indeed, on this basis, the
federal court in Orlando v. Laird 245 held that the Vietnam War was
constitutional, Congress' approval through appropriation being tanta-
mount to a formal declaration of war.24
In Orlando, two enlistees in the United States Army separately
sought to enjoin enforcement of their deployment orders to Viet-
nam.247 The enlistees argued that by ordering them to fight a war not
authorized by Congress, the commanding officers acted beyond their
power under the Constitution.248 After deciding that the case did not
pose a political question, 249 the court ruled that congressional spend-
ing for the war sufficiently ratified the military activity despite the fact
that war had not been expressly declared. 250 The court cited coopera-
tion between Congress and the Executive in the exercise of military
activity in Vietnam.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution... was passed at the request of Presi-
dent Johnson and, though occasioned by specific naval incidents in
the Gulf of Tonkin, was expressed in broad language which clearly
showed the state of mind of the Congress and its intention fully to
implement and support the military and naval actions taken by the
President at that time in Southeast Asia .... 251
No such congressional authority or acquiescence was involved in
243. There appears to be no case law settling the question of the legality, if not the consti-
tutionality, of United States activity in Laos during the Vietnam War. Professor Ely's study,
supra note 20, is probably the first authoritative analysis of the issue. See also Ely, The Ameri-
can War in Indochina, Part I. The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About,
42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990) [hereinafter Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 1].
244. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I, supra note 243, at 897-99.
245. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
246. Id. at 1043. Other cases analyzing the Vietnam War's constitutionality include:
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d
Cir. 1973); Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26
(1st Cir. 1971); and Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
247. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1040.
248. Id.
249. This was one of the few instances in which a constitutional attack on the Vietnam
War was determined to present a justiciable question. E. BARRETT, JR., W. COHEN & J.
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 466 (8th ed. 1989).
250. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043.
251. Id. at 1042.
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the bombing of Laos.25 2 To the contrary, the operations were deliber-
ately undertaken by the executive branch without congressional
knowledge.25 3  No money was knowingly appropriated to support
these activities. Consequently, there is no basis on which to find con-
gressional approval. This strongly suggests that United States mili-
tary activity in Laos did not involve a state of war in the
constitutional sense.
If the bombing of Laos cannot be classified as part of a war, even
an undeclared one, the second prong of the Johnson test is not met,
and the combatant activities exception does not apply. The combat-
ant activities exception thus appears to be surmountable because the
government might not be able to satisfy either the combat or the war
requirement. The case law interpreting the exception as well as the
dictionary definitions of combat suggest that the exception does not
apply here: Skeels called for actual conflict, 254 In re Agent Orange
looked for direct engagement with the enemy, 255 and the dictionary
definition requires a duel or contest between groups. 25 6 None of these
conditions was present when the United States bombed Laotian vil-
lages. Moreover, Johnson and the FTCA's legislative history make it
clear that a war is necessary. 257 While formal declaration of war is
not needed if Congress has taken other steps to signify its approval of
executive action, 258 Congress did nothing to indicate its support of
United States activity in Laos. Thus, no war existed in Laos. With-
252. See Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I, supra note 20, at 1116-21, 1134
(discussing, and eventually dismissing, an argument that "a substantial number of those in
Congress had at least an inkling of what was happening in Laos all along ....").
253. H.R. REP. No. 327, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1971). "Information that has been
furnished is misleading and incomplete. Neither the Congress nor the American people has
been told the entire truth about the nature or type of U.S. operations in Laos." Id.; see Ely,
The American War in Indochina, Part II, supra note 20, at 1116-37. One argument defending
the constitutionality of the war in Laos discussed by Professor Ely is that the war was not in
fact a secret because
any alert member of Congress or the public could have learned what was happening
by careful attention to the right public reports-and thus, I guess the argument is
supposed to run, Congress authorized it by not cutting any of the appropriations it
might have surmised were being used to fund it.
Id. at 1100. Professor Ely concludes that it is nonsense to argue that "despite the administra-
tion's lies, we the American people were on sufficient notice of the nature of our government's
activities in Laos that by not pressuring our representatives to stop them, we tacitly acqui-
esced." Id. at 1132.
254. Skeels, 72 F. Supp. at 374; see text accompanying note 214.
255. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1255; see text accompanying note 221.
256. See text accompanying notes 227-28.
257. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 769-70; see text accompanying notes 232-33.
258. See text accompanying notes 234-246.
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out war, there can be no combatant activities within the meaning of
the FTCA.
4. Discretionary Functions Exception
A more severe obstacle to asserting Laotian claims under the
FTCA is the "discretionary functions" exception. Section 2680(a) of
the Act states that the FTCA does not apply to "any claim... based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused." 25 9
The leading case interpreting this exception is Dalehite v. United
States,260 an FTCA wrongful death action arising out of an explosion
of ammonium nitrate fertilizer produced according to government
specifications. 26' The fertilizer was to be exported to countries sub-
ject to post-World War II military occupation, under a federal pro-
gram designed to increase the food supply in those areas.262 The
district court ruled for the plaintiff, finding that the government's de-
cision to adopt the fertilizer program was negligent, as was the gov-
ernment's supervision of manufacturing, packaging, and shipping.
263
However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the discretionary
functions exception barred the district court from exercising
jurisdiction. 2
64
The Court described the type of discretion necessary for the ex-
ception to apply. "It is the discretion of the executive or the adminis-
trator to act according to one's judgment of the best course .... 263
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the exception should
not apply because some of the acts directly causing the explosion oc-
curred at the operational level rather than at the planning stage.
266
The Court held that the discretionary functions exception covers even
the actions of government employees who implement the policy deci-
sions made by their superiors, as long as those acts require the em-
259. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
260. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
261. Id. at 18, 20.
262. Id. at 19.
263. Id. at 23.
264. Id. at 24.
265. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 34.
266. Id. at 34-35.
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ployee to exercise his judgment.
267
Two years later, in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,268 the
Court implicitly narrowed Dalehite's broad reading of the discretion-
ary functions exception. In Indian Towing, the Coast Guard oper-
ated a lighthouse on an island off the coast of Mississippi. 269 The
plaintiff's tugboat ran aground due to the alleged negligence of Coast
Guard personnel in maintaining the lighthouse.270 The plaintiff then
sued the United States under the FTCA.271 The Court held that the
discretionary functions exception did not apply. 27 2
The Court agreed that the Coast Guard did not have to provide
lighthouse service. However, once the Coast Guard made the policy
decision to provide service, any injury caused by the negligent opera-
tion of the lighthouse would not be excepted from liability under the
FTCA.273 Some courts have interpreted Indian Towing to hold that
the discretionary functions exception applies only to basic policy deci-
sions and not to actions taken while executing those policies. 274 Read
267. Id. at 43.
It is unnecessary to define ... precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to
hold, as we do, that the "discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis for
suit under the [Federal] Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of pro-
grams and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or adminis-
trators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that
acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with
official directions cannot be actionable.
Id. at 35-36.
268. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
269. Id. at 62.
270. Id.
The specific acts of negligence relied on were the failure of the responsible Coast
Guard personnel to check the battery and sun relay system which operated the light;
the failure of the Chief Petty Officer who checked the lighthouse ...to make a
proper examination of the connections which were "out in the weather"; the failure
to check the light between September 7 and October 1, 1951; and the failure to repair
the light or give warning that the light was not operating.
Id.
271. Id. at 61-62.
272. Id. at 68.
273. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exer-
cised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance
on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain
that the light was kept in good working order .... If the Coast Guard failed in its
duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under
the [Federal] Tort Claims Act.
Id.
274. E.g., Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967). "It is now well established that when the government undertakes to perform
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this way, Indian Towing effectively limits the scope of the discretion-
ary functions exception as held by the Court in Dalehite.275
One such case narrowly interpreting Indian Towing was Ward v.
United States.276 There, the plaintiff claimed that he was injured
when a sonic boom caused the automobile under which he was work-
ing to fall on him.277 The Third Circuit held that under the circum-
stances, military supersonic flights fell within the discretionary
functions exception because the flights involved policy decisions. 278
The court relied on affidavits from three high-level officers stating
that, as a matter of national security, training flights of supersonic
aircraft over populated areas were necessary to simulate actual com-
bat conditions. 279 The court noted that, although the ordering of su-
personic aircraft flights falls within the discretionary functions
exception, any negligence of pilots in carrying out those orders would
not.280
Another suit involving the discretionary functions exception with
respect to military activities was Bulloch v. United States.28 1 Plaintiffs
claimed damages for injuries to their sheep herds resulting from nu-
clear tests conducted by the United States. 28 2 The plaintiffs alleged
that government employees performed the tests negligently.283 In re-
jecting the government's discretionary function defense, the court rea-
soned that if the policy decisions involving the manner of conducting
the tests had already been made, then any lack of ordinary care in
failing to warn local sheep herders was actionable under the FTCA. 28 4
The court emphasized that "[w]e must look to the nature of the acts
services, which in the absence of specific legislation would not be required, it will, nevertheless,
be liable if these activities are performed negligently." Id. at 236.
Other often-cited cases involving the discretionary functions exception include United
States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984)
(negligence of Federal Aviation Administration employees in certifying an airplane); Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (negligence of Forest Service employees in fighting
fire); and United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (discharged veteran negligently treated
in a Veterans Administration Hospital).
275. See Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1257
(D.D.C. 1973).
276. 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973).
277. Id. at 668.
278. Id. at 669.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 670. No such pilot negligence was involved in the case. Id.
281. 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
282. Id. at 886-87.
283. Id. at 887.
284. Id. at 889.
1990]
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J[
or omissions, themselves, rather than to the nature of the major pro-
ject or undertaking in the course of which they occur.' 2 5  Thus,
Dalehite and its progeny stand for the proposition that, while execu-
tive policy decisions will be covered by the discretionary functions
exception, acts by government employees implementing those policy
decisions will not.
The bombing of Laos involved many levels of both decision-mak-
ing and operational conduct. The initial policy decision to bomb Laos
as part of the Vietnam War effort was presumably made at the highest
levels of the executive branch. Like the government's decision to use
Agent Orange as an herbicide, 286 the decision to bomb Laos was cer-
tainly in the "discretion of the executive or the administrator to act
according to one's judgment of the best course," as articulated in
Dalehite.2 7 Similarly, decisions as to when, where, and whom to
bomb in Laos are analogous to the decisions in Bulloch of when,
where, and in what manner to conduct nuclear tests.288 Such deci-
sions no doubt fall within the scope of the discretionary functions
exception.
To the extent that the alleged tortious conduct of the United
States in bombing Laos consisted of top level decisions to bomb that
country, including decisions to use cluster bomb units, the govern-
ment would be shielded from liability by the discretionary functions
exception. Policy decisions to forego clean-up of the country after the
war would likewise be protected. The same might be true of the dis-
cretionary daily targeting decisions made by junior Foreign Service
285. Id. at 890. In holding that the discretionary functions exception did not apply, the
court posited two extremes and then suggested that the case fell somewhere in the middle. Id.
at 888. On the one hand, it was clear that decisions at any level as to how, when, and in what
manner to conduct nuclear tests would fall within the exception. Id. On the other hand, an
accident involving an employee driving an automobile within the scope of his duties obviously
would not qualify under the exception, because the decision to drive too fast would not involve
discretion with respect to his duties, but would merely constitute carelessness. Id.
The discretionary functions exception was also an issue in the In re Agent Orange cases.
One case involved the University of Hawaii's field tests of Agent Orange. The plaintiffs, uni-
versity employees, claimed that they were injured as a result of negligent handling and packag-
ing of the herbicide. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 210, 212 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987). The court dismissed the allegations of negligent
handling as vague and irrelevant to the issue of discretion, flatly rejecting any argument that
the decision to use the herbicide was not a discretionary function. Id. at 215.
286. In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 215.
287. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 34.
288. Bulloch, 133 F. Supp. at 888.
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officers at the United States embassy in Vientiane. 2 9
Claims of tortious conduct based upon the negligence of flight
crews on bombing missions, however, would not fall within the dis-
cretionary functions exception, because such conduct was incident to
the purely operational stage of the policy. If one accepts the United
States' official claim that Laotian villages were bombed by mistake,
those mistakes are analogous to the Coast Guard's negligence in its
operation of the lighthouse in Indian Towing.290 The United States,
having taken on the task of assisting Laos in warding off the North
Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao, is liable if it failed to exercise the req-
uisite care to protect civilian safety. This argument is supported by
the court's statement in Bulloch that the exception has no applicabil-
ity once discretion has been exercised and the negligence occurs in
implementing the policy. 291 Moreover, the court in Ward stated that
"ordering an army maneuver is a discretionary function, but the neg-
ligent operation of an army vehicle during such a maneuver is not.
'292
This is exactly what occurred in the air over Laos, if one accepts the
government's public explanation that the bombing of civilian targets
in Laos was an accident.
B. Foreign Claims Act
A claimant whose FTCA action is barred by the foreign country
or discretionary functions exception is not necessarily without legal
redress against the United States. A possible administrative remedy
exists under the Foreign Claims Act.293 The FCA allows inhabitants
of foreign countries to pursue claims of up to $100,000 against the
289. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
290. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 62.
291. Bulloch, 133 F. Supp. at 889.
292. Ward, 471 F.2d at 670.
293. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988). The FCA states in pertinent part:
(a) To promote and to maintain friendly relations through the prompt settlement of
meritorious claims, the Secretary concerned... may appoint... one or more claims
commissions... to settle and pay in an amount not more than $100,000, a claim
against the United States for-
(3) personal injury to, or death of, any inhabitant of a foreign country; if the
damage, loss, personal injury, or death occurs outside the United States.... and is
caused by, or is otherwise incident to noncombat activities of, the armed forces ....
(b) A claim may be allowed under subsection (a) only if-
(3) it did not arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly
from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat, except that a claim
may be allowed if it arises from an accident or malfunction incident to the operation
of an aircraft of the armed forces of the United States, including its airborne ordi-
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United States294 for personal injury or death caused by noncombat
activities of the United States military that occur in a foreign coun-
try.295 A commission appointed by the appropriate military Secretary
rules on the claim. 296 If the Secretary determines that a successful
claim merits more than $100,000, he or she may pay the award and
report the excess amount to the Comptroller General for payment.
297
A plain reading of the FCA indicates that Laotian villagers who
are injured today fall within the class of claimants whom the Act was
designed to benefit. 298 The Lao are inhabitants of foreign countries
who were injured by activities of the United States military. The only
potential issue is whether bombing villages constitutes combatant ac-
tivity. However, the FCA expressly defines as noncombat activity a
category of military action that is directly applicable to the bombing
of Laos.2 99 Section b(3) states that claims arising out of military air-
craft accidents or malfunctions occurring before, during or after a
combat mission-including accidents involving "airborne ord-
nance"-are specifically allowed under the Act.3 00 As noted earlier,
to the extent the United States officially admits that Laotian villages
were bombed, it claims the bombings were accidental.3 0 1 Even if the
nance, indirectly related to combat, and occurring while preparing for, going to, or
returning from a combat mission.
Id. Note that recovery under the FCA is initially limited to $100,000, whereas the FTCA
imposes no such limit. Therefore, an action under the FTCA would be more desireable.
The FCA is not to be confused with the Military Claims Act ("MCA"), 10 U.S.C. § 2733
(1988), which provides an administrative remedy for personal injury or death caused by the
negligent acts of military personnel or by acts of military personnel engaged in noncombat
activities. The MCA has no foreign country exception. However, its purpose is not to benefit
inhabitants of foreign countries; rather, its aim is to provide a remedy for Americans who
suffer injury at the hands of the United States military in other countries and would therefore
be precluded from recovering under the FTCA. See Poindexter v. United States, 777 F.2d 231
(5th Cir. 1985).
294. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a).
295. Id. § 2734(a)(3).
296. Id. § 2734(a). Of course, under the circumstances posed here, such a tribunal's im-
partiality must be questioned.
297. Id. § 2734(d).
298. Id. § 2734(a).
299. Id. § 2734(b)(3).
300. Id. For the full text of section (b)(3), see supra note 293 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Given the apparent stringency of [the] rules of engagement, it is difficult to see how
roads with civilian traffic, villages and groups of civilians could have been bombed,
rocketed, or napalmed. It seems clear, however, although the rules are stricter now
than they were some years ago, that mistakes do happen ....
STAFF REPORT ON LAOS: APRIL 1971, supra note 54, at 11 (emphasis added).
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bombing raids themselves are deemed combat missions, 30 2 the alleged
mistakes necessarily occurred during the mission or on the return
trip. Therefore, potential Laotian plaintiffs could successfully employ
the FCA to obtain compensation for their injuries caused by the
United States military.
C. Summary: Effect of Existing Statutory Law
Although the FTCA exposes the government to tort liability in
many contexts, it gives potential Laotian plaintiffs no practical legal
remedy against the United States. As a sovereign nation, the United
States has the power to choose when it will consent to be sued.30 3
This consent, implicit in the FTCA, has been limited by various ex-
ceptions. 3°4 For prospective Laotian plaintiffs to prevail under the
FTCA, they must successfully overcome the foreign country, combat-
ant activities, and discretionary functions exceptions.
As illustrated above, it may be possible to establish that the
United States bombing of Laos did not constitute combatant activity
within the meaning of the FTCA.305 Yet this is merely a Pyrrhic vic-
tory, for two hurdles still remain. Those FTCA claims which allege
negligence in the policy decisions made in Washington easily bypass
the foreign country exception. However, the discretionary functions
exception effectively destroys such claims, for the negligence that oc-
curred in this country entailed decisions that involve policy discre-
tion.3° 6 To the extent that operational level action constituted the
tortious activity, the discretionary functions hurdle is cleared. 307 But
because the tortious conduct occurred in Laos, those claims are pre-
cluded by the foreign country exception. Thus, when analyzed sepa-
rately, the foreign country, combatant activities, and discretionary
functions exceptions may appear to be surmountable. Yet in combi-
nation, the trio sound the death knell for FTCA claims brought by
victims of past United States wars fought on foreign soil.
Although potential Laotian plaintiffs have little chance for an un-
limited recovery under the FTCA, they may have a viable remedy
under the FCA. The foreign country requirement of the FCA poses
302. If one concludes that the bombing raids were not combat missions, then they would
be "noncombat activity" and the FCA would certainly apply.
303. See supra text accompanying note 131.
304. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 206-58.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 286-89.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 290-92.
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no difficulty. A Laotian claimant merely needs to establish that the
bombing of Laos was not a combatant activity of the United States
military.308 This showing would not be difficult in light of the specific
language of the FCA covering "accidents" that occur during or after
combat missions.30 9
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Although the likelihood of success under the FTCA is slim, the
FCA may provide Laotian villagers with a possible remedy against
the United States. Any actual relief under the FCA, however, may be
unlikely because of the political circumstances in Laos. Given Laos'
current communist government, 310 it is questionable whether a suc-
cessful plaintiff would be allowed to keep any recovery for his or her
own use. Because potential claimants may think they will be able to
keep the money, they may still bring suit. Some may believe that
upon receiving monetary compensation they will be permitted to emi-
grate to the West. Finally, the Lao government may encourage, or
even require, potential plaintiffs to sue the United States and then
confiscate the judgment.
Thus, while FCA claims may cost the United States a large sum
of money, that amount may ultimately benefit Laos' communist gov-
ernment rather than the plaintiffs themselves. If the United States
federal government is to furnish any monetary redress, it would be
better spent if provided indirectly, through private and international
relief agencies such as the International Red Cross. These agencies
could use the money to clear the land of the unexploded bombi and
provide medical care to victims in Laos, thereby providing the most
needed form of redress.
Congress is in a strong position to achieve this result. In return
for information on United States military personnel missing in action
in Laos, 311 Congress could create a fund to be administered by private
308. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
309. Id.
310. See Y.B. ON INT'L COMMUNIST AFF. 1989, 233-34.
311. L.A. Times, July 30, 1988, part I, at 8, col. 3. There are 2,394 Americans classified as
"missing or unaccounted for" in Southeast Asia. "The total includes 1,758 in Vietnam, 547 in
Laos, 83 in Cambodia and six in China." Id. But see Sesser, supra note 7, at 66 (stating that
the number of MIAs in Laos today is 533).
In 1984, the United States employed similar tactics when it donated 5,000 tons of rice to
Laos in efforts to entice Laos to cooperate in the search for MIAs. L.A. Times, June 25, 1984,
Part I, at 2, col. 2. During the Reagan Administration, Vietnam also linked official coopera-
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and international organizations. 312 These groups could go to Laos
with the proper equipment and, in cooperation with the Lao govern-
ment, clear the land of bombs or train the Lao to clear it themselves.
The political and ideological differences between the two governments
would be insulated by working through relief agencies. Everyone
could win. The villagers would no longer live in constant fear of
bombi, nor would they be forced to undertake the time and expense of
litigating in a foreign country. The communist government would
improve its image in the eyes of its local constituents.313 Further-
more, the United States would receive credit in the international com-
munity for rectifying a serious human rights problem, while obtaining
important information on its missing servicemen.
314
V. CONCLUSION
Exceptions to the FTCA create a formidable barrier to Laotian
villagers seeking damages against the United States government for
injuries caused by bombi left in Laotian soil after the Vietnam War.
tion on the MIA issue to economic aid. L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1988, Part II, at 7, col. 1. How-
ever, actual United States aid to Laos has been minimal.
In five separate years, the United States donated emergency rice shipments,
worth a total of ten million five hundred and ninety thousand dollars. Over four
years, it sent a hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars in medical supplies, the last
contribution being duly recorded as four thousand dollars worth in 1987. The crop-
substitution program has brought seven hundred thousand dollars so far. All these
figures add up to eleven million four hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars in
American aid over a fifteen year period-approximately the average amount spent
for five days of the nine years of bombing.
Sesser, supra note 7, at 66.
The United States and Laos have attempted to cooperate on the issue of American MIAs
in Laos. Although both countries agreed to respect the other's humanitarian concerns, the
United States emphasized that there was no direct link. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS 1987, 579-81 (1988).
312. The communist government in Laos would be understandably reluctant to allow
United States military or government personnel into the country for security reasons. This is
supported by the fact that the United States embassy in Vientiane is limited to a handful of
staffers and conducts business related only to POW/MIA information and to drug trafficking
problems. See Sesser, supra note 7, at 66.
313. One potential problem to note is that the Lao government has rejected what little
assistance the United States has officially offered. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, § A, at 9, col. 1
(city final ed.); L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, part I, at 5, col. 1; Sesser, supra note 7, at 66. The
United States first made offers to help clear unexploded bombs from the Plain of Jars in 1978.
It reiterated the offer in 1981 but the Lao government did not respond. L.A. Times, Nov. 8,
1981, part I, at 5, col. 1. Private North American aid agency workers in Laos believe that the
local officials and the farmers would welcome whatever assistance is offered, regardless of who
it comes from. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, § A, at 9, col. 1 (city final ed.).
314. To prevent double recovery by Laotian victims, Congress at some point would have
to amend the FCA to specifically bar future Laotian bombi claims.
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The FCA provides a limited administrative remedy, but it is unlikely
to directly benefit successful Laotian plaintiffs.
Although these provisions appear to protect the United States
from unlimited liability, the threat of costly liability still remains. If a
federal court were to interpret the FTCA's exceptions loosely, the
government could be required to pay a large sum of money. Further-
more, the prospect of multiple Laotian claimants under the FCA is
not remote. It is likely that a Laotian villager injured by a United
States bombi in Laos would have a successful administrative claim
against the United States Army or Air Force. Once news of that suc-
cess spreads, many more Lao might be encouraged to bring claims
under the FCA. Although recovery is limited to $100,000 in most
cases, the awards could multiply quickly. Under either scenario, the
United States government could be subject to substantial liability.
Faced with even a remote chance of exposure to potentially
costly FTCA liability, or with the prospect of multiple plaintiffs seek-
ing $100,000 or more each under the FCA, it would behoove Con-
gress to act affirmatively before any legal action is contemplated.
Money could be provided to relief agencies to fund clean-up opera-
tions in Laos. Such a program could persuade the Lao government to
provide greater assistance in the United States' on-going search for
information on MIAs in Laos and other parts of Southeast Asia.
Both sides have considerable incentive to cooperate. By working to-
gether, both governments will be viewed favorably in the international
arena for addressing each other's respective human rights concerns.
Kenneth P. Kingshill *
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